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Research on legislative ethics has shown how scandals often trigger ethics reform; yet, the content of 
the reform often differs from that of the scandal. Why is this the case? And if scandals don’t explain 
legislative ethics reform outcomes, then what does? If not this kind of external shock, then what 
factor(s) shape legislative reform outcomes? These questions provide the point of departure for a case 
study of the European Parliament’s 2011 ethics reform. Drawing from the legislative ethics literature 
and from recent theories of institutional change, the article examines the impact of the scandal that 
initiated the reform, the interests and strategies of reform agents who wanted a quick reform process 
that would not undermine the EP’s independence; and the institutional order in which those actors 
were embedded.  It argues that an institutional logics perspective offers a convincing and 
comprehensive account of EP ethics reform, and suggests a new analytical framework that might be 
used by researchers in future research on legislative ethics. 
 
 Introduction 
The second half of the twentieth-century witnessed diminishing levels of trust in public institutions 
and actors, alongside claims that representative democracy was in crisis. One of the consequences of 
this decline in trust was that parliaments became as much the object of scrutiny as an instrument 
thereof. Media and civil society organisations criticised unethical parliamentary conduct, and policy-
makers responded by enhancing the transparency of and public control over the conduct of legislators 
(Leston-Bandeira 2012). Amongst other initiatives, they did this by setting up public ethics systems. 
Public ethics systems are frameworks of rules, processes and instruments designed to compel 
and/or encourage public servants to adhere to high standards of conduct and to prevent and/or deter 
unethical behaviour. These systems may be regulatory and punitive (adopting a compliance 
approach), or based on softer mechanisms which emphasise social learning and individual reflection 




understandings of good governance; they set out expectations of how a public servant ought to 
behave; and they rest on the assumption that public actors should be held to a higher standard than 
ordinary citizens (Gutmann and Thompson 1985: 168). Even if some commentators question whether 
ethics systems have had any effect either on the conduct of public actors or on public trust, they allow 
organisational leaders to be seen to be doing something to address public concerns (though see Saint-
Martin and Thompson 2006 for a dose of scepticism). There is however no one-size-fits-all approach. 
Ethics systems must be contingent, reflecting cultural and institutional differences. As well as 
acknowledging the distinctiveness of national and cultural contexts, this means that frameworks 
designed for administrators may for good reason differ from those for legislators.  
Contemporary research on legislative ethics originated in the United States in the1970s with 
studies of the US Congress. Much less research has been conducted on legislative (or parliamentary) 
ethics systems than on executives however (though see, for example, Jennings and Callahan 1985; 
Mancuso 1995; Preston et al 1998; Gay 2004; Saint-Martin and Thompson 2006; and Allen, 2010). 
This may be because, in contrast to developments in other public and professional organisations, 
legislative ethics reforms have been relatively modest. Rosenson explains that this is because 
politicians ‘are notoriously loath to enact ethics laws that constrain their own behavior’ (Rosenson 
2003: 42-43). It is often said that it is only when scandals expose unethical practices that parliaments 
are persuaded to reform (Saint-Martin 2014: 163).  
Yet tracing the source of ethics reforms to scandals alone is reductive. It leaves no room for 
agency-based explanations. Moreover, where reform outcomes differ from the focus of the scandal, a 
puzzle emerges: what, if not (only) scandal explains ethics reform? This puzzle is a relevant starting-
point for studying the case of the European Parliament. The Parliament engaged in its reform over the 
course of 2011 following a scandal in which several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
were filmed agreeing to accept money in exchange for proposing legislative amendments. With great 
haste, by the end of 2011 an ethics reform had been approved, backed by an overwhelming majority 
of MEPs. What explains the ethics system approved by the European Parliament in 2011?  This 
article argues that to understand fully how and why reform occurred it is necessary to account not 




agents (in support of a quick reform and one defending the EP’s independence), and the institutional 
order in which those actors are embedded.  
Drawing from institutional theory, the EP’s ethics system is conceptualised as an institution, 
and ethics reform as a form of institutional change. The empirical research uses a process tracing 
methodology (see Beach and Pedersen 2013) and draws on official documents and reports, including 
those produced in-house by the European Parliament and by civil society organisations. These reports 
are supplemented by contemporaneous media sources and research interviews.  
The first of the sections that follow identifies three explanations of institutional change resting 
on: exogenous triggers; endogenous agency; and ‘institutional logics’. The article then presents the EP 
case study and assesses which of these explanations best explain the case. It charts the process by 
which the new ethics system was approved; it summarises the reform outcome; and provides an 
evidence-based analysis of the case. The conclusion summarises the empirical and theoretical 
findings, states the primary argument, and draws out the wider implications of the research for the 
study of legislative ethics and institutional change. 
 
Institutional Change and Legislative Ethics 
Historical institutionalism has come a long way since the late 1980s (Hall and Taylor 1996). In the 
early phases of this research agenda, institutions were studied primarily as independent variables, and 
historical institutionalism was criticised for focusing on institutional continuities at the expense of 
explanations of institutional formation and adaptation. A great deal has since been written on how 
institutions are created and how they change.  
Historical institutionalists initially saw institutions as the product of exogenous factors, 
particularly shocks or crises (Pollack 1996; Pierson 2004). These events were transformative, with the 
periods between them characterised by stasis. This so-called ‘punctuated equilibrium’ approach 
resonates with the study of legislative ethics since scandals are often claimed to be the source of ethics 
reform. But institutional change may also be driven by actors, whether by collective actors such as 
legislatures and social movements (e.g. Rao et al 2000: 240; Colyvas and Powell 2006: 343) or by 




be an endogenous process, generated from within the institution and owing much to institutional 
entrepreneurship and leadership (e.g. Greif and Laitin 2004; Levy and Scully 2007; Capoccia 2016). 
As institutions distribute power and resources amongst political actors, political battles over the 
introduction of new institutional arrangements are frequently intense. These battles, and the strategies 
pursued by reform leaders to respond to them, are crucial in shaping reform outcomes (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010). 
 This actor-centred approach resonates with the study of legislatures as political arenas. The 
interests of actors inside and outside parliaments are reflected in the politicisation of debates on 
legislative ethics (Gay and Rush 2004: 1). To avoid undermining the cohesion and credibility of the 
legislature, ethical issues may even be set to one side for political reasons. Alternatively, political 
actors may seek a consensus on ethics reform which involves watering-down maximalist initiatives. 
Gutmann and Thompson (1985) have shown, for example, how ethics have become politicised in the 
US Congress, with legislators going out of their way not to sit on ethics committees to avoid having to 
criticise their fellow legislators. In the UK, political parties are often responsible for sanctioning 
Members of Parliament (MPs) which suggests that the former have a major stake in any reform 
agenda. Ethics reforms can therefore become subject to inter-party bargaining and compromise or, 
alternatively, to conflict and political competition (Allen 2010: 117, 120).  
 A contrasting approach supplements the agency-focused approach with an institutional one. 
The institutional logics perspective places actors in their societal context, stressing the importance of 
culture and the symbolic in shaping institutional change. It is based on the premise that society is 
composed of institutional orders that operate according to logics which moderate or limit self-interest, 
leaving actors only partially autonomous in cases of institutional reform (Thornton et al 2012). The 
concept of an institutional order is in line with what Dimitrakopoulos similarly terms a ‘normative 
order’, that is, ‘the prevailing ideological proscriptions and prescriptions, … the dominant norms, 
principles and ideas regarding appropriate behaviour, which hold a given institutional structure 
together and provide an abstract definition of standards of appropriate behaviour and “compass” for 




within organisations, but can also be drawn upon in times of crisis or uncertainty to legitimise and 
guide political decision-making (Dimitrakopoulos 2005: 679).  
The institutional logics perspective resonates with legislative ethics research because of the 
symbolic functions that parliaments perform. Parliaments in liberal democracies ‘are symbols of 
popular representation in politics’ (Hague and Harrop 2004: 247) and their independence is an 
important indicator of this symbolic role. In representative democracies parliamentarians represent 
their electorates who can remove governing parties at election-time. In the interim, parliaments are 
subject to limited external control. An expression of this parliamentary autonomy is the right of 
parliaments to draft and revise their own ‘rules of procedure’. These rules normally include guidance 
on how parliamentarians are expected to behave. Parliaments will often resist attempts by outsiders to 
influence internal rules, including those establishing ethical standards, and will also oppose external 
influence over their implementation and enforcement (Saint-Martin 2014: 164).  
Thus, the institutional change literature suggests three theoretical explanations of ethics 
reform. The first expects to find that reform is the product of an external shock (a scandal perhaps); 
the second explains reform to be shaped by the interests and strategies of reform agents, especially 
those in positions of organisational leadership; the third gives explanatory weight to the constraining 
and enabling effects of the institutional order(s) within which actors and their interests are embedded 
and in which actors’ strategies are engendered (but at the same time acknowledges that those interests 
and strategies matter). Before testing these explanations against the evidence, the following sections 




The Ethics Reform  
In mid-2010 two journalists set up a ‘sting’ operation (The Sunday Times, 21 March 2011). The 
journalists claimed to work for a lobbying firm representing private clients who were opposed to 
proposed rules on banking regulation (Mittermaier 2011). Of the large number of MEPs initially 




exchange for tabling legislative amendments; a fourth MEP was implicated to a lesser degree. The 
scandal was widely publicised, provoking the EP’s Bureau to act swiftly to revise its internal rules on 
MEP conduct (European Parliament 2011a).1   
The then EP President, Jerzy Buzek, immediately announced an internal investigation into the 
allegations. The accused MEPs’ offices were sealed and Buzek contacted the relevant national anti-
corruption agencies who might prosecute the individuals involved. The EU anti-corruption body, 
OLAF, announced that it too would investigate the case. OLAF involvement was initially resisted by 
the EP President on the advice of the Parliament’s Legal Service, and four OLAF investigators were 
prevented from carrying out an initial inspection of the MEPs’ offices on 22 March (Brand 2011a and 
b). Buzek argued that MEPs enjoyed full immunity under parliamentary rules (Brand 2011b; 
European Parliament 2011b: 25) and that OLAF did not have the right to investigate unless EU funds 
were implicated (Nielsen 2012). This provoked an outcry from Green and Far Left MEPs, as well as 
some negative press attention. It eventually led Buzek to concede that OLAF could enter the EP’s 
premises under certain conditions (European Parliament 2011c Brand 2011b).  
Buzek stressed that the EP had to learn from the scandal and show ‘zero tolerance’ to 
corruption (FoEE et al 2013: 5; see also European Parliament 2011a – comment by Diana Wallis). 
This meant strengthening the Parliament’s ethics framework (Brand 2011c). The Conference of 
Presidents agreed in principle on 31 March in that a working group would be set up (European 
Parliament 2011d). The issue was discussed by the Bureau on 4 April, and possible reforms were 
identified. The plan was to reach an agreement on changes to the EP’s Rules of Procedure (European 
Parliament 2010; Brand 2011d). A few days later, on 7 April, the Conference of Presidents gave its 
more formal blessing to the establishment of a cross-party Bureau working group to report back 
before the summer recess (European Parliament 2011e; European Parliament 2011d). Even though 
there was some expectation that the Vice-President with responsibility for transparency, Diana Wallis 
(ALDE, UK), would chair this group, Buzek himself took on the role, with Wallis and Stavros 
                                                          
1 The EP President is responsible for internal parliamentary business. The President is a member of the Bureau 
with the Vice-Presidents and Quaestors which deals with the EP’s internal organisation. The latter works 





Lambrinidis (S&D, Greece) as Vice-Chairs (Interview #1). The working group of ten MEPs in total 
met weekly over ten weeks for two-to-three hours a time from April 2011 to the end of June 
(European Parliament 2011b; Brand 2011d; BBC 2011). The working group was composed of 
Members from all political groups (European Parliament 2011e), with a good cross-section of 
member states represented.2 Each meeting was preceded by an agenda-setting pre-meeting comprising 
the EP President and the two Vice-Chairs (European Parliament 2011d). The latter played an 
important part in shaping the discussions within the working group (Interview #1). In addition, there 
was an exchange of views with civil society at the end of May. 
In its deliberations, the working group drew on a comparative table of relevant rules that had 
been compiled as a report by the EP’s Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) 
(European Parliament 2011b; European Parliament 2011d; European Parliament 2011f; Interview #2). 
The examples in the Report were chosen to provide the working group with a repertoire of ethics rules 
from which they could pick the most appropriate. This exercise produced a ‘conglomerate of what 
existed in varied forms across Europe’ (Wallis 2011). It was felt that there was no other way in which 
the working group could operate given the short time-horizon (Interview #1).  
The Constitutional Affairs Committee Chair and Rapporteur, Carlo Casini, acknowledged 
later in the process that the emergence of a ‘broad consensus’ on the Code was ‘also due to the work 
done by all political forces at the highest level’ (European Parliament 2011g). However, by the end of 
June some members of the group were talking openly to journalists about the ongoing reform 
discussions, expressing concern that the outcome would be watered down by the large political groups 
(Brand 2011e). Claude Turmes, the Green MEP from Luxembourg said he was ‘not optimistic’ that 
the Parliament would adopt tougher rules as the working group had failed to reach agreement on the 
reforms. He expected opposition, particularly over whether MEPs should continue to be allowed to 
hold second jobs, a particularly contentious issue (Brand 2011e). Cornelis (Dennis) de Jong, the 
Dutch European United Left/European Green Left (UEL/NGA) MEP suggested that it was the centre-
                                                          
2 As well as Buzek, Wallis and Lambrinidis, the working group comprised Jan Zaharil (ECR, CZ); Claude Turmes 
(Greens/EFA, LU), Alejo Vidal-Quadras (EPP, ES), Francesco Speroni (EFD, IT), Cornelius (Dennis) de Jong 




right European People’s Party (EPP) that was most hesitant to accept changes a claim the EPP 
subsequently rejected (Brand 2011f). A parliamentary official following the work of the group said 
that both the European People’s Party (EPP) and S&D were split on how far the reforms should go 
(Brand 2011d).  One activist noted in June that he believed that some early progressive suggestions 
had, by the end of the process, been thrown out (Hoederman 2011).  
By the end of June, however, the working group was able to submit their recommendations to 
the Bureau and the Conference of Presidents (European Parliament 2011f; European Parliament 
2011b: 23). Both bodies approved the recommendations very quickly in early July (European 
Parliament 2011f). The issue was picked up again after the summer recess and was discussed by the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO). Committee members proposed amendments (European 
Parliament 2011h; 2011i) and a few technical revisions were agreed (Wallis 2011), after which the 
Code was unanimously approved (with one abstention) on 17 November. The proposals were then put 
to a plenary vote on 1 December. 619 MEPs voted in favour, two voted against and six abstained 
(Brand 2011e). The new arrangements came into force on 1 January 2012. 
 
The Reform Outcome 
The reform introduced in early 2012 led to the introduction of a Code of Conduct which included a 
revamped Declaration of Financial Interests and the establishment of an Advisory Committee on the 
Conduct of Members. The Code focused primarily on conflicts of interest and set out core ethical 
principles: disinterest, integrity, openness, diligence, honesty, accountability, and respect for the 
European Parliament’s reputation (European Parliament 2012; art. 2(1)). It instructed MEPs to (a) 
take steps to address any conflict of interest; (b) report any conflict to the EP President; or (c) ask the 
Advisory Committee for advice. MEPs were to acknowledge any conflict of interest before speaking 
or voting in the Parliament and when serving as a rapporteur on a particular file, assuming they had 
not already identified the conflict of interest in their Declaration.   
In addition, MEPs were to complete a Declaration of Financial Interests, listing, amongst 
other information, their prior occupation, secondary employment and investment interests. The form 




circumstance thereafter was to be reported within 30 days. The Code limited the acceptance of gifts to 
those valued below EUR 150 (European Parliament 2012: art. 5) and introduced new rules on the 
reimbursement of travel, accommodation and subsistence and on the direct payment of expenses by 
third parties.  
The Advisory Committee was to be composed of five MEPs appointed by the EP President 
from amongst members of the Bureau and the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committees. Political 
experience and balance was to be reflected in the appointment process and each member of the 
Committee was to hold the chair in rotation for a period of six months. The Committee was to meet 
roughly every month to offer guidance to MEPs on request. The EP President could ask the Advisory 
Committee for advice on a possible breach of the Code, and all breaches were to be notified to the 
Advisory Committee which could hear from the MEP concerned. The Committee would then make a 
recommendation to the President. The President would hear from the Member concerned and would 
then adopt a reasoned decision laying down, if necessary, a penalty. Penalties ranged from ‘a simple 
reprimand, to a fine, to a proposal to deprive the Member of one or more official roles’ (European 
Parliament 2011b: 25-26). Sanctions were to be notified to the Member and announced in a plenary 
session of Parliament, appearing on the EP website for the remainder of the parliamentary term.  
While the reform was welcomed as a step in the right direction, it was also criticised on a 
number of grounds. The new system did not include any post-employment restrictions in response to 
the so-called ‘revolving doors’ issue. This was highlighted by the critical NGO umbrella group, 
ALTER-EU, who called for a two-year cooling off period after MEPs leave the Parliament and before 
they were able to take on a lobbying position linked to their previous role (de Clerck 2011). 
Moreover, there was no restriction in the ethics rules on MEPs taking second jobs (Brand 2011a; 
Roovers 2012); and no independent advice or expertise was to be sought by the Advisory Committee 
(FoEE et al 2013: 26). Critics argued that self-regulation was ‘not an adequate response to the risks of 
overlap between the public and private interests of officials acting and legislating on behalf of the 
public interest’ (FoEE et al 2013: 7). The same critics also pointed to the inadequacy of the sanctions 
available to those in breach of the Code, suggesting that a breach ought to provoke an exclusion 




to MEPs on what constituted a conflict of interest (FoEE et al 2013: 3, 8, 25-26), leaving it to 
Members to interpret the rules as they saw fit; declarations could only be submitted in handwritten 
form and could be submitted in any language (FoEE 2012); and there was no system of supervision 
over the declarations, or automatic ‘flagging’ for updates made by MEPs (FoEE et al 2013: 4). It was 
also unclear who would be responsible for judging a case involving the EP President. 
The core criticism, therefore, was that the new ethics system proposed transparency as a cure 
for ethical misconduct (de Clerck 2011; European Parliament 2011j). The new system combined some 
innovations – the Code and the Advisory Committee – with revisions to earlier requirements, such as 
the completion of the Declaration. It gave MEPs responsibility for their own conduct and guidance 
over reporting requirements, and in so doing it also created a clearer, more transparent ethics system. 
Yet it was criticised by activist NGOs for not going far enough: ‘[i]f the code is to be meaningful, it 
should not only be used to highlight conflicts of interest, but also to address them’ (FoEE et al 2013: 
8). The critics argued that the enforcement mechanisms in the Code were ‘insufficient’ (FoEE et al 
2013: 25) and amounted to little more than a ‘paper exercise’ (Regner 2013). The EP, by contrast, saw 
the new system as a great leap forward and as an appropriate response to earlier criticism that the 
Parliament, prior to 2011, had had no effective system of ethics management. 
 
Interests, Strategies and Norms: The Institutional Logic of EP Ethics Reform 
What explains this reform outcome? More specifically, to what extent are external shocks, the 
interests and strategies of internal reform agents and the wider institutional order important in 
accounting for the reform outcome? 
The cash-for-amendments scandal of March 2011 acted as a trigger for reform, demanding an 
urgent response from the European Parliament. While there was guidance on ethical conduct in place 
before 2011, that guidance was weak and poorly implemented and enforced; calls for reform had gone 
unanswered. It took a crisis to provoke action by the EP. This is very much in line with the 
expectations of the punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change as the latter assumes 
transformative change to be the product of an external shock. Yet the explanatory force of an 




the issues raised by the scandal. While the latter involved MEPs accepting payment for proposing 
legislative amendments, the reform did not explicitly address the relationship between MEPs and 
lobbyists. Indications in the early working group deliberations that this issue would form part of the 
reform agenda were dropped. While the scandal clearly triggered the reform, it does not therefore 
explain its content. 
The content of the reform is more convincingly explained by the interests of actors within the 
European Parliament: interest in the process of the reform – that is, that the reform should be quick 
and uncontroversial; and interest in the reform content, that the outcome of the reform should not 
undermine the independence of MEPs. These interests shaped the Parliament’s reform strategy in that 
it led to: (i) an absence of external influence over the reform process and its outcome; (ii) caution over 
the selection of reform leaders; (iii) the depoliticisation of the ethics issue during the reform; and (iv) 
a reliance on administrative practices to focus (or limit) the scope of the reform. 
First, efforts to keep other EU actors out of the parliamentary reform process were evident in 
the EP’s reluctance to allow OLAF to investigate the scandal (European Parliament 2011b: 25). 
Moreover, while there was a small number of meetings with outside organisations during the process, 
the EP’s working group dropped a public consultation that had been flagged at the start of the reform; 
and there was no evidence that they sought advice from independent advisors or ethics experts beyond 
their own officials (Interview #2). It is therefore not surprising that at the end of the reform process 
the ethics committee also eschewed a role for external members or advisors, and that no consideration 
was given to a Commission proposal, mooted earlier, to set up an inter-institutional ethics committee. 
Second, the need for consensus also meant that the EP leadership was keen to avoid the 
involvement of reform leaders who might not have widespread support. Diana Wallis, a Vice-
President with responsibility for transparency, would have been the obvious choice to lead the 
working group, but there was opposition from other political group leaders to her appointment 
(Interview #1). A more palatable decision for the EP leadership, a compromise, was to appoint the EP 
President to chair the working group, with Wallis and Stelios Lambrinidis (S&D) actively involved as 




Third, de-politicisation became an important a way of facilitating compromise. The politics of 
ethics reform has a cultural dimension within the multi-national environment of the EU institutions. 
There are very different views on ethics across the EU. While it is difficult to identify explicit cultural 
biases in the case evidence as cultural differences were not politicised in an overt manner, such biases 
can easily hide behind party politics. Party political contestation, reflecting the power dynamics that 
characterise the day-to-day work of the EP is evident in this case (Interview #1), with the key 
cleavage dividing the two larger political groups who pushed for a modest reform, from the smaller 
groups, particularly those to the left of the Socialists (S&D), but also including some (but not all) 
Liberals (ALDE), who wanted a more comprehensive and enforcement-oriented approach. Even with 
the larger groups, however, there were disagreements over the line to take. To minimise the effects of 
politicisation, political balance in the decision-making process (i.e. in the composition of the working 
group and of its leadership) was important, as were the terms of reference of the group. The strategy 
worked. There were certainly disagreements over the content of the reform, but because the working 
group met in camera, with the hard bargaining done behind-the-scenes, there was relatively little 
public expression of disagreement. So even though the Code of Conduct was approved after 
‘concentrated political discussions’ (Wallis 2011) in which it became clear that the focus of the 
reform would be transparency, the outcome could be agreed on ‘whatever our political family’ 
(Interview #1).  
Fourth, the EP’s own internally generated analysis helped to shape the reform outcome 
(European Parliament 2011d). Even if this was a routine administrative practice, the reliance on a 
report from the EP administration which selected pre-existing ethics models as sample cases, 
reinforced the EP leadership’s control over the content of the reform. The models identified in the 
Report were not ideal-types in any abstract sense, but were real-world examples. The limitations of 
this approach were recognised. Mittelmaier (as reported in EUD 2011), then head of the Brussels 
office of Transparency International, suggested that some of the cases, especially the German one, 
were not good models; and in the EP’s Constitutional Affairs Committee on 24 May, Andrew Duff, 
the ALDE shadow rapporteur on the dossier, expressed concerns over the methodology used by the 




to build up a sort of fortress… I think that we must do something that is qualitatively better (EUD 
2011). Adopting this kind of approach presented options for reform, therefore, but also closed off 
other, more controversial, outcomes. There was no time or inclination for ‘blue skies’ thinking in 
designing the EP’s ethics reform. 
Thus, together, external shocks and the interests and strategies of internal reform agents 
explain convincingly the timing and the content of the reform; and as such the analysis might 
conclude at this point. Yet, one question remains: why did the reform agents see it in their interests to 
pursue a tightly controlled reform which ensured the independence of MEPs? To answer this question, 
it is necessary to look beyond the specific case to the wider institutional context within which it sits: 
that of the EP within the European Union (EU). 
The European Parliament is a ‘transnational body operating in a system of multilevel 
governance’ (Judge and Earnshaw 2008: 24). This, together with its tendency to work towards 
consensual outcomes, makes the institution highly distinctive. Yet the EP also performs functions 
generally associated with parliaments, such as policy-making, representation and legitimisation. It is a 
political arena characterised by political competition and conflict. It fashions itself as the mouthpiece 
of European citizens, with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) performing a representative 
function on the basis of their independence from outside influence and control. The EP has over time 
evolved to become a co-legislator (with the Council of the EU) within the EU legislative process. 
Even if there are still doubts as to whether the EU can be viewed as a parliamentary democracy, this 
normalisation, which has gone hand-in-glove with a politicisation of the EP has meant that even if it 
remains distinctive there are now fewer grounds on which to judge the EP as anything but a ‘real’ 
parliament.  
While the growth of the EP’s decision-making capacity has been justified as a response to the 
EU’s democratic deficit, there is no easy correlation between the EP’s legislative power and its 
legitimacy. The legitimacy deficit, of which the democratic deficit is a part, cannot be attributed to 
one EU institution but is a feature of the EU in its inter-institutional form. However, declining turnout 
in EP elections, a relative lack of trust in and knowledge of the EP, and – in some quarters - media 




rather than as a solution to the EU’s legitimacy deficit. One of the main difficulties for the EP has 
been the performance of an effective linkage function connecting the EU to its citizens (Hix and 
Høyland 2011: 54). 
The EP is therefore characterised by a certain tension between its normalcy, reflected in its 
now substantial legislative powers, and its exceptionalism, expressed through its contribution to the 
EU’s legitimacy deficit. This makes parliamentarians defensive of the EP’s powers and protective of 
their independence but at the same time attentive to the criticism that the Parliament needs to be more 
responsive to its publics. This may not be internalised by all actors – political and administrative - 
within the Parliament, but it is embedded institutionally, influencing the responses of the EP 
leadership – the President, Bureau and Conference of Presidents– when difficult decisions are to be 
taken.  
This EP/EU context makes sense of the interests pursued by EP reform agents during the 
ethics reform process. Moreover, there is some evidence, albeit rather modest, that the strategy 
pursued by EP leaders entailed efforts to legitimise the reform within the Parliament in order to gain 
for it as much support as possible. This involved EP leaders drawing instrumentally on normative 
arguments (that is, referring explicitly to the EP’s normative order) as a way of demonstrating support 
for the reform. At this stage, at the end of the process, the emphasis was on the democratic deficit 
dimension of the EP’s normative order rather than on its desire for independence which had already 
been dealt with at an earlier stage. An illustrative example can be found when an MEP, Guiseppe 
Gargani, proposed oral amendments to the reform before the final plenary vote. The rapporteur on the 
file, Carlo Casini, replied: 
I believe that we need a very broad consensus to demonstrate that this Parliament is a 
transparent parliament, that it is concerned only with the common good, and that each one of 
us is personally honouring the commitment […] to serve only the common good and 
European integration. Hence, I believe that there should be a very broad consensus… 
(European Parliament 2011j). 
A similar language was used in a later press release when Casini said that ‘[t]he wide consensus 




Following this speech, proposed amendments were rejected and over 99 per cent of MEPs 
voted in favour of the reform. Approval had taken only 10 weeks (European Parliament 2011j) This 
was extremely impressive given how controversial ethics reforms can be, not least in a multi-national, 
multi-cultural organisation as is the EP. Although the influence of the political groups over their 
members at this point in the process should not be ignored, the EP leadership was able to make a clear 
case for reform based on a general fit with the EP’s institutional order, helping to produce an 
unequivocally consensual outcome. 
 Thus, while the external context explains why reform took place in 2011, and the interests and 
strategies of reform agents account for reform content, the response (interests and strategies) of EP 
leaders to the scandal and the success of the reform can only be fully understood in the light of the 





This article began with a puzzle: that while legislative ethics reforms tend to be driven by ethics 
scandals, the content of the reform at the end of the process does not always reflect the content of the 
scandal. If not the scandal, then, what shapes legislative ethics reforms? One recent contribution to the 
legislative ethics literature (Saint-Martin 2014) highlighted the importance of actors’ interests. A 
similar argument is found within the broader institutional change literature. A rather different 
institutionalist literature points to the relevance of normative factors, suggesting that institutional 
logics (Thornton et al. 2012) might have some relevance to legislative ethics reforms in that they 
shape the interests of key actors as well as the strategies they pursue to serve those interests.  
 To investigate this puzzle, the research presented above focused on a single case, that of the 
European Parliament’s 2011 ethics reform. It used this case to judge the relative merits of three 
explanations of the EP ethics reform outcome. The first, that the scandal triggering the reform shaped 
the content of the reform, was easily dismissed, even though the scandal clearly determined the timing 




reform outcome, produced a highly convincing explanation in that the desire for a speedy and 
uncontroversial reform which did not impinge on the independence of Parliament shaped the reform 
outcome. The third, investigating the relevance of the institutional logics at play within the EP (and 
the wider EU) showed how the normative environment in which actors’ interests and strategies were 
developed, and explained how those interests came to be deemed appropriate. As such, this latter 
approach offers the most comprehensive and convincing account of the EP’s 2011 ethics reform, 
incorporating within in it the second explanation, but offering a richer account than the latter alone 
could do. 
This research makes an original contribution to the study of legislative ethics, both 
empirically and theoretically. First, it offers the first case-study of the European Parliament’s ethics 
system. As such it contributed to the burgeoning literature on the governance of public ethics and 
integrity in the EU institutions. While further empirical research is needed on the EP’s ethics regime, 
and on other EU institutions, this article is the first to shed light on why the reform took place as well 
as offering a commentary on the nature of that reform.  
Second, this article also has broader theoretical implications for the study of legislative ethics. 
In showing how theories of institutional change might be relevant to such studies, it suggests a new 
analytical framework. More specifically, it shows that while scandals may be an important trigger for 
legislative ethics reform, they may not explain the ethics system that emerges from reform process 
that ensues. The interests of reform leaders, shaped by the institutional order within which the 
parliament sits, offer a more comprehensive guide to direction that the reform process will take. The 
context will differ, but certain characteristics of this case-study may also be relevant to other 
parliaments. It would not be unlikely, for example, to find that parliamentary independence holds 
symbolic significance in other cases. Likewise, concerns about the democratic deficit, though 
distinctive in the European case, will also have resonance in other parliamentary contexts. It is 
therefore possible to account for why parliaments push for reforms when the media spotlight falls on 
them, but are at the same time reluctant to relinquish control over the reform outcomes. As such, 
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